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If Not Now, When?
The California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006: California's Final Steps Toward




After eighteen years of legislation and agency activity to address cli-
mate change, California is now mandating a comprehensive scheme for the
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions from. the entire state. Three bills
have laid the groundwork for this system: Assembly Bill 1493,' which focuses
on emissions from new vehicles sold in California; Senate Bill 1368,2 which
concerns minimum emissions standards from power plants supplying elec-
tricity to California consumers; and Assembly Bill 32,' which takes into ac-
count emissions from the state as a whole, now known as the California
Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006.
As the first state to undertake mandatory greenhouse gas regulation
and a state with unique regulatory abilities, California faces several novel
legal challenges based on potential conflict with federal environmental stat-
utes, the Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution, and the for-
eign affairs power of the Executive Branch. This note will focus on the most
ambitious of the three bills mentioned above, the California Global Warm-
ing Solutions Act. Part 11 will put California's recent legislation in national
context by outlining the history of federal greenhouse gas regulation. Part
* I.D. Candidate 2008, University of California Hastings College of the Law, San
Francisco, California. During the spring of 2007, Mr. Visick was a legal intern in the
office of California Assemblymember lared Huffman, where he staffed bills related to
energy and climate change.
1. Cal. A.B. 1493, 2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 200 (amending CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 42823 and adding CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5), available at
http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/01 -02/bill/asm/ab_1451-500/ab_1493_bill 20020722_
chaptered.pdf.
2. Cal. S.B. 1368, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 598 (codified at CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §§
8340-8341), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/sen/sb_ 135 1-
1400/sb_ 1368 bill_20060929_chaptered.pdf.
3. Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488 (codified at CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE
§ 38500-38599), available at http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/pub/05-06/bill/asm/ab_0001-
0050/ab_32_bill 20060927_chaptered.pdf.
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II will chart the history of California's mandatory greenhouse gas emissions
regulations. Part IV will detail the California Global Warming Solutions Act
and the stages through which the regulations will be crafted and imple-
mented. Part V will examine the legal challenges the Act may face, based in
part on current challenges to the vehicle emissions regulations mandated by
Assembly Bill 1493. Part VI will briefly consider the range of possible out-
comes of this anticipated litigation for California, finding that each would
spell some measure of success.
I!. Greenhouse Gas Regulation and the United States
The United States' response to climate change began with the Na-
tional Climate Program Act of 1978, which established a program to study
the causes and effects of climate change.4 Nine years later, concerns about
the effects of anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions led Congress to
amend the National Climate Program Act with the Global Climate Protection
Act of 1987, which established the National Climate Program to do research
on climate change, investigate ways to mitigate its causes, and focus on in-
ternational efforts to control it.' In 1990, Congress passed the Global
Change Research Act, which called for an annual report to Congress, re-
search into energy efficiency and the climate change implications of urban
and suburban development practices, and discussions with other nations on
ways to coordinate climate change research.6
As a result of the negotiations authorized by the Global Climate Pro-
tection Act of 1987, President George H.W. Bush endorsed the United Na-
tions Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) during the Earth
Summit in Rio de Janeiro in 1992. 7 The UNFCCC was later ratified by the
Senate and went into effect in 1994.8 The agreement does not set specific
targets for each signatory to meet, but it does set the broad goal of returning
4. Robert B. McKinstry, Jr., Esq., Laboratories for Local Solutions for Global Problems:
State, Local and Private Leadership in Developing Strategies to Mitigate the Causes and Effects of
Climate Change, 12 PENN ST. ENVTL. L. REV. 15, 20 (2004) (citing National Climate Pro-
gram Act, Pub. L. No. 95-367, 92 Stat. 601 (1978)).
5. Id. at 20-21 (citing Global Climate Protection Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-
204, 101 Stat. 1407 (1987) (codified at 15 U.S.C. 2901-2908 (2003))).
6. Id. at 21 (citing Global Change Research Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-606,
104 Stat. 3096 (codified at 15 U.S.C. 2921-2961 (1990))).
7. Id. at 17 (citing United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
May 29, 1992, U.N. Doc. A/AC.237/18 (1992), reprinted in 31 I.L.M. 849 (1992), available at
http//:unfccc.intlresource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf); see also Connecticut v. Am. Elec.
Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265, 269 (S.D.N.Y. 2005).
8. McKinstry, supra note 4, at 17.
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greenhouse gas emissions to 1990 levels.9 Additionally, the UNFCCC sets
out general principles that should be followed by the signatories. A central
principle is that developed countries should take the lead in combating cli-
mate change.
The UNFCCC was followed in 1997 by the Kyoto Protocol, which stipu-
lates specific targets for greenhouse gas emissions reductions from signato-
ries to the UNFCCC.' ° The Kyoto.Protocol, upholding the central principles
of the UNFCCC, only requires mandatory reductions in emissions from de-
veloped countries." President Bill Clinton signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998
but did not present it to the Senate for ratification. 2 Prior to its negotiation,
the Senate voted 95-0 on the Byrd-Hagel Resolution of 1997 to "urge the
President not to sign any agreement" which threatened serious harm to the
economy or which did not also mandate emissions reductions from develop-
ing countries. 3 To underscore its disapproval of the Protocol, Congress
passed legislation to block the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) from
implementing it.'
4
President George W. Bush opposes the Kyoto Protocol. He objects to
greenhouse gas reduction measures that do not impose mandatory regula-
tion on developing nations who are "major emitters."" His Administration
argues that the approach taken by the Kyoto Protocol "would shift jobs and
emissions from one country to another without slowing worldwide growth in
emissions. '6 Instead, the Bush Administration advocates a policy of inter-
national cooperation devoted to finding an "efficient and coordinated re-
sponse to global climate change."
Meanwhile, in the absence.of federal greenhouse gas regulation, sev-
eral states have taken steps toward regulation on their own.' 7 In 2002, Cali-
9. id. at 17-18.
10. Id. at 17.
11. id at 18-20 (citing Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Con-
vention on Climate Change, Dec. 10, 1997, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add. I (1998),
available at http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/kpeng.pdf).
12. id. at 17.
13. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1177 (E.D. Cal.
2006) (citing Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (citing S. 98, 105th Cong. (1997))).
14. Id. (citations omitted).
15. Am. Elec. Power, 406 F. Supp. 2d at 270.
16. Felicity Barringer & Andrew C. Revkin, Measures on Global Warming Move to
Spotlight in the New Congress, N.Y. TIMES, January 18, 2007, at A24.
17. While this note is concerned with mandatory state regulation of green-
house gases, it should be noted that a number of local governments have also taken
steps to reduce greenhouse gas emission as well. A good source of further informa-
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fornia passed Assembly Bill 1493, which instructed the California Air Re-
sources Board ("Board") to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from vehicles
in California. 8 Eleven other states representing roughly 33% of the nation's
passenger vehicles have adopted identical regulations.' 9 In 2003, seven
Northeast and Mid-Atlantic states joined forces to form the Regional Green-
house Gas Initiative ("ReGGle") to design a cap-and-trade regulatory pro-
gram aimed at reducing carbon dioxide emissions from power plants in the
region.20 In 2006, California passed the California Global Warming Solutions
Act, creating the first comprehensive, mandatory greenhouse gas regulation
scheme in the United States.2'
III. Mandatory Greenhouse Gas Regulation and California
As discussed earlier, California's mandatory greenhouse gas regulation
scheme is derived from three bills. Assembly Bill 1493, passed in 2002, ad-
dresses greenhouse gases from new vehicles sold in California.22 Senate Bill
1368, passed in 2006, establishes a greenhouse gas emissions standard that
all power plants selling power to California electricity consumers, including
those outside the state, must meet.23 The California Global Warming Solu-
tions Act of 2006 is the most ambitious of the three, and it mandates the
tion on local initiatives is the Cities for Climate Protection program run by the Inter-
national Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, http://www.iclei.org.
18. See generally Cal. A.B. 1493, 2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 200.
19. These states are California, Connecticut, Maine, Massachusetts. New Jer-
sey, New York, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Vermont, and Washington. Let-
ter from Senators Feinstein, Snowe, Specter, Cantwell, Chaffee, Menendez, Collins,
Boxer, McCain, leffords, Reed, Lautenberg, Leahy, Wyden, Dodd, Lieberman, Sar-
.banes, Murray, Kennedy, Schumer, and Bingaman to Stephen L. Johnson, Adm'r, U.
S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (March 30, 2006) (available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/06releases/pavley-ltr.pdf). Under 42 U.S.C. § 7507, no
state may adopt vehicle emissions regulations more stringent than those under the
Clean Air Act unless they "are identical to the California standards for which a waiver
has been granted." Michael H. Wall, The Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative and California
Assembly Bill 1493: Filling the American Greenhouse Gas Regulation Void, 41 U. RICH. L. REV.
567, 578 (2007) (citing Clean Air Act § 177, 42 U.S.C. § 7507 (2000)).
20. Connecticut, Delaware, Maine, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, and
Vermont are already participating. Maryland expects to become a participant in the
process by June 30, 2007. The District of Columbia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, the Eastern Canadian Provinces, and New Brunswick are observers in
the process. About RGGI, http://www.rggi.org/about.htm.
21. See Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488.
22. Cal. A.B. 1493, 2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 200.
23. Cal. S.B. 1368, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 598.
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creation of a statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit that takes all sources
into account.24
California's significant transportation sector emissions made regula-
tion of greenhouse gases from vehicles a logical first target. In 2005, the
transportation sector was the largest source of greenhouse gas emissions in
the state at 41.2%, followed by industrial at 22.8%, and electric power gen-
eration at 19.6%.25 Nationally, electrical power generation produced a much
larger share of greenhouse gas emissions at 40%, while transportation sector
emissions were 33%.26 California's greenhouse gas emissions from power
generation are lower than the national rate because the state relies primarily
on natural gas-fired power plants for electrical generation rather than .coal-
fired power plants, which account for 82% of emissions from electrical gen-
eration nationally.
27
In 2002, Assembly Bill 1493 directed the California Air Resources Board
to develop regulations that would generate the "maximum feasible and cost-
effective" reduction in greenhouse gases from new vehicles, starting with the
2009 model year.28 The Board adopted regulations in 2004.29 This note will
refer to these as the "Pavley regulations," after the bill's author, Assembly-
member Fran Pavley.3° The emissions standards in those regulations are
scheduled to take effect in 2009, becoming increasingly stringent through
model year 2016." Manufacturers earn credits for outperforming the regula-
tory requirements in a given year or producing vehicles that use alternative
fuels that produce less greenhouse gases.32 These credits may be sold or
24. Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488.
25. GERRY BEMIS AND JENNIFER ALLEN, Inventory of California Greenhouse Gas Emissions
and Sinks: 1990 To 2002 Update 7, CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION (December 2006),
available at http://www.energy.ca.gov/2005publications/CEC-600-2005-025/CEC-600-
2005-025.PDF.
26. See ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Emissions of Greenhouse Gases in the U.S. 2005 16
(2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggrptlpdf/057305.pdf.
27. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., Greenhouse Gases, Climate Change, and Energy Figure 3
(2006), available at http://www.eia.doe.gov/oiaf/1605/ggccebro/chapterl.html (citing
ENERGY INFORMATION ADMINISTRATION, Emissions of Greenhouse Gasses in the United States
2001 (2002)).
28. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a)-(b) (codified from Cal. A.B. 1493,
2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 200, sec. 3).
29. Wall, supra note 19, at 576.
30. See Cal. A.B. 1493, 2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 200.
31. Id. at 576-77.
32. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep v. Witherspoon, 456 F. Supp. 2d 1160, 1164 (E.D. Cal.
2006).
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banked as offsets for fleets that do not meet the regulatory requirements.33
The Pavley regulations are currently being challenged in district court by a
coalition of automobile manufacturers and dealers in Central Valley Chrysler-
Jeep v. Witherspoon.34
In 2006, California took a more comprehensive approach to the regula-
tion of greenhouse gases when it passed the California Global Warming So-
lutions Act of 2006 (Act). The Act directs the Board to regulate all sources of
greenhouse gas emissions in California.3" Clearly, this will include the elec-
trical generation and industrial sources not covered by the Pavley regula-
tions. 6  Additionally, while the Act doesn't explicitly target vehicular
sources, it does provide for regulation of vehicular sources if the Pavley
regulations do not remain in effect.3"
IV. The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006
On September 28, 2006, Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger signed the
California Global Warming Solutions Act into law, committing California to
reducing emissions of six primary greenhouse gases to 1990 levels by the
year 2020.38 the Act replaces a system of statewide greenhouse gas emis-
sions "targets" established by the Governor in June 2005'9 with a mandatory
regulatory scheme, and stipulates a process and a timetable for designing
and implementing comprehensive greenhouse gas regulations."
The Legislature designed the Act to address threats to California's
"economic well-being, public health, natural resources, and . ..environ-
ment." These include degradation of air and water quality; reduction of wa-
33. Id.
34. Id. at 1165-66. The same regulations are also being challenged in U.S. Dis-
trict Court in Vermont. See Green Mountain Chrysler Plymouth Dodge Jeep v. Dalmasse, slip
copy, 2006 WL 3469622 (D. Vt. Nov. 30, 2006). The wording of the Vermont regula-
tions is exactly the same as California's, as required by the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. §
7507. Because these are parallel trials, there is thepossibility of a circuit split.
35. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38505(m), 38585(n), 38562 (codified from
Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
36. See id.
37. Id. § 38590.
38. The Act regulates carbon dioxide, methane, nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocar-
bons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur hexafluoride. Id. § 38505(g).
39. Exec. Order No. S-3-05 (2005), available at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/
executive-order/1861/.
40. See Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488.
41. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a) (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal.
Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
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ter supply from snowmelt; displacement of businesses and people due to
rising sea levels; increases in environmentally-related health problems; and
negative impacts on the state's largest industries, including agriculture and
tourism.42 The Legislature intended the Act to build upon California's role
as a national and international leader in energy conservation and environ-
mental stewardship; move California to the "forefront of national and inter-
national efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases;"43 and encourage
other states, the federal government, and other countries to take action to
address the issue of global warming.44 In addition, because California would
need to invest in new technologies to meet the emissions targets laid out in
the Act, the Legislature believed the Act would position California's econ-
omy to take advantage of a developing market in energy-efficient technolo-
gies.45
In the nearly two decades that preceded the passage of the Act, Cali-
fornia took actions on climate change that divided responsibility for control-
ling emissions of greenhouse gases between several agencies. In 1988, As-
sembly Bill 4420 made the California Energy Conservation and Development
Commission the state's lead agency for climate change issues and directed
it to "prepare and maintain the state's inventory of greenhouse gas emis-
sions. '46 In 2000, Senate Bill 1771 mandated the creation of the non-profit
California Climate Action. Registry. The Registry's task was to encourage
voluntary greenhouse gas reductions from entities doing business within the
state; help these entities to establish emissions baselines and record and
verify voluntary emissions reductions consistently; and push for recognition
and proper consideration of voluntary greenhouse gas reductions by these
entities in any future federal greenhouse gas regulatory regime.47 In July
2002, Assembly Bill 1493 made the Board, a division of the California Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency, responsible for regulating greenhouse gas
emissions from vehicles.' In 2005, Executive Order S-3-05 laid out ambi-
42. id. § 38501(a)-(b).
43. Id. § 38501(c).
44. ld. § 38501(d).
45. Id. § 38501(e).
46. Cal. A.B. 4420, 1988 Cal. Stat., ch. 1506; see also http://www.energy.ca.gov/
global-climate-change/index.html.
47. CAL. HEALTHY & SAFETY CODE § 42800-42871 (codified from Cal. A.B. 1771,
2000 Cal. Stat., ch. 1018, sec. 1).
48. Assembly Bill 1493 directed the California Air Resources Board to regulate
vehicles to "achieve the maximum feasible and cost-effective reduction of green-
house gases." CAL. HEALTHY & SAFETY CODE § 43018.5(a) (codified from Cal. A.B. 1493,
2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 200, sec. 3).
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tious greenhouse gas reduction goals49 for California and directed the Secre-
tary of the California Environmental Protection Agency to assemble a multi-
agency team to oversee California's progress toward meeting these targets
and report biannually to the Legislature and the Governor on both Califor-
nia's progress and the impacts of global warming on the state."
The California Global Warming Solutions Act vests central authority for
monitoring and regulating greenhouse gas emissions in the Board." The
Board is given primary responsibility for determining the statewide green-
house gas emissions level in 1990 and establishing a system of regulations
to reduce California's emissions to that level by 2020.2 The Act requires the
Board to consult with specific groups, including other state agencies and in-
dustrial groups whose interests will be affected, and adopt regulations
through an open and public process. 3 The Board must also take certain fac-
tors, such as impacts on some industries and issues of technological feasi-
bility, into account in devising its regulatory scheme. 4 However, the Board
is given ultimate authority to adopt regulations as it sees fit, and it has the
power to impose civil and criminal penalties on entities that violate them."
The emissions reductions mandated by the Act roughly parallel those
required of the United States by the Kyoto Protocol. The most notable dif-
ference is that the targets laid out in the Kyoto Protocol are slightly more
stringent. While California must bring statewide greenhouse gas emissions
to 1990 levels, 6 the Kyoto Protocol called for the United States to reduce
emissions to 5% below 1990 levels. 57 Otherwise, the requirements are the
same. In each case, the parties have fourteen years to comply. Further, both
seek to regulate emissions of the same six gases: carbon dioxide, methane,
nitrous oxide, hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons, and sulfur
hexafluoride.8
49. The Order established reductions targets of 2000 levels of greenhouse gas
emissions by 2010, 1990 levels by 2020, and 80 percent below 1990 levels by 2050.
Exec. Order No. S-3-05.
50. Id. This team of multiple agencies is known as the Climate Action Team.
51. Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488.
52. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530-38563 (codified from Cal. A.B. 32,
2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
53. Id. §§ 38501-38560.
54. Id. § 38501(f), 38501(g), 38560.5(c).
55. Id. §§ 38560-38580.
56. Id. § 38550.
57. Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate
Change, U.N. Doc. FCCC/CP/1997/L.7/Add. 1 (1998).
58. Id. Annex A; CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38505(g) (codified from Cal. A.B.
32, 2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. I).
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A. Advisory Committees
The Act calls for the Board to assemble two committees to advise it on
implementation of the regulations called for in the Act. Together, they re-
flect the Act's purposes of protecting California's public health and eco-
nomic well-being.
By July 1, 2007, the Board will convene an environmental justice advi-
sory committee to assist the Board in developing a scoping plan that will
eventually lead to regulations.' 9 The scoping plan is due on or before lanu-.
ary 1, 2009. Comprehensive regulation of greenhouse gas emissions will
include regulation of sources that affect low-income and minority communi-
ties disproportionately. Therefore, the Act specifically provides that the
members of this committee shall come from California communities with
the "most significant exposure to air pollution" and that they shall include
members of communities with "minority populations or low-income popula-
tions, or both."6' Members of the environmental justice committee are cho-
sen by the Board from nominations submitted by environmental justice and
community groups.52
The Board will also appoint an Economic and Technology Advance-
ment Advisory Committee to advise it on measures that will encourage the
investment in technology and its deployment to mitigate greenhouse gas
emissions. 63 The duties of this committee include: identifying and assessing
"new technologies, research, demonstration projects, funding opportuni-
ties;" "developing state, national, and international partnerships and tech-
nology transfer opportunities;" and advising the Board on "state, regional,
national, and international economic and technological developments re-
lated to greenhouse gas reductions."'
B. Early Action Measures
A June 2005 report by the California Energy Commission documented
greenhouse gas emissions from certain large-scale emitters.6' These include
"oil and natural gas extraction, crude oil refining, food processing, stone,
clay, glass and cement manufacturing, chemical manufacturing, and cement
production."' 6 Because data on emissions from these sources has already
59. Id. § 38591.
60. Id. § 38561(a).
61. Id. § 38591 (a).
62. Id. § 38591(b)-(c).
63. Id. § 38591(d).
64. Id.
65. BEMIS & ALLEN, supra note 25, at 7-10.
66. Id. at 9.
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been gathered, these industries may face regulation sooner than undocu-
mented emitters.
By July 1, 2007, the Board will publish a list of "discrete early action
greenhouse gas emission reduction measures.,6 7 Regulations to implement
the early action measures will be adopted by January 2, 2010.m The Board
has indicated that these measures would likely be accomplished through a
command-and-control style of regulation, though it has not ruled out the
possibility of market-based regulation of these sources in the long run.'
C. Establishing a Reporting Program
On or before January 1, 2008, the Board will adopt rigorous regulations
to govern the reporting, verification, and monitoring of greenhouse gas
emissions from California.7 ° In the case of greenhouse gas emissions from
electricity consumption, the Board will consider all electricity consumed in
the state, whether or not it was generated in California.7 Electricity line
losses will be included as well.72 In developing these regulations, the Board
will concentrate on sources that contribute the greatest greenhouse gas
emissions first.73
The reporting requirements imposed by the Act are flexible. In part,
this is to allow the Board to update its requirements, if necessary.74 How-
ever, this flexibility is also designed to allow the Board to accommodate ex-
isting and proposed reporting requirements of other states, the federal gov-
ernment, and other nations.75
Thorough reporting, verification, and monitoring of greenhouse gas
emissions have been a distinguishing factor of California's greenhouse gas
accounting for some time. As discussed above, California formed the Cali-
fornia Climate Action Registry (CCAR) in 2000 as a non-profit entity devoted
to the encouragement of energy efficiency and the voluntary reporting of
67. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560.5(a) (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006
Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. I).
68. Id. § 38560.5(b).
69. California Air Resources Board, The California Global Warming Solutions Act of
2006: Public Workshop to Discuss Discrete Early Emission Reduction Actions (Jan. 22, 2007),
available at http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/I 1907afternoon.pdf at slide 7.
70. See CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530 (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal.
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greenhouse gas emissions in a consistent format.7 6 The CCAR required par-
ticipants in its program to report both direct emissions, such as emissions
from onsite vehicles and onsite combustion of fuels, and indirect emissions,
such as emissions from electricity consumption or offsite heating and cool-
ing.7  While participants were initially required to report only in-state
greenhouse gas emissions, nationwide reporting was required within three
years of registration, and international corporations were encouraged to re-
port global greenhouse gas emissions.
7 8
The Act directs the Board to incorporate the CCAR reporting and verifi-
cation system, where appropriate, as it devises regulations for mandatory
reporting.79 For entities that participated in the CCAR prior to December 31,
2006, the Act directs the Board not to "significantly alter their reporting or
verification system" except where necessary.8 0
D. Establishing a Baseline of Emissions
The Act sets a goal of bringing California's greenhouse gas emissions
to 1990 levels by the year 2020 but leaves it to the Board to determine that
1990 level. By January 1, 2008, the Board must quantify the amount, which
then becomes the "statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit."8' The Board
must consider the "best available scientific, technological, and economic in-
formation" in its determination.82 Additionally, interested parties will have a
chance to comment prior to the Board's determination through a series of
public workshops.83 The determination of this baseline will likely be a con-
tentious issue, as a lower number will require steeper cuts in greenhouse
gas emissions.
Arriving at a correct figure for the statewide greenhouse gas emissions
limit is vital. Unlike the requirements for reporting and verification of emis-
sions levels, which the Board may adjust as needed, the statewide green-
house gas emissions limit will remain static until 2020 unless amended or
76. See CAL. HEALTHY& SAFETY CODE § 42810 (codified from Cal. A.B. 1771, 2000
Cal. Stat., ch. 1018, sec. 1).
77. Id. § 42840(b)-(c).
78. Id. § 42840(d).
79. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530(b)(3) (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006
Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
80. Id. (Many California businesses, perhaps in an effort toward regulatory cer-
tainty, took advantage of this provision and registered themselves with the CCAR in
the final days of 2006).
81. Id. § 38550.
82. Id.
83. Id.
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repealed by the Legislature or ballot initiative. 4 Moreover, regulated indus-
tries, especially larger industries, will need regulatory certainty in order to
make long-term investments in plants and equipment. 5
E. Deciding on a Regulatory Scheme
On or before January 1, 2011, the Board will adopt regulations to re-
duce greenhouse gas emissions in California. These regulations will be-
come effective on January 1, 2012.86
The Act does not mandate a particular scheme of regulation. Rather,
the Board has the authority to impose the regulatory scheme that it believes
will achieve the "maximum technologically feasible and cost-effective reduc-
tions" of greenhouse gas emissions by 2020.8' In designing regulations, the
Board must consider several factors. Any regulations should: (1) be equita-
ble, maximize benefit to all Californians, and encourage early emissions re-
ductions, (2) not facilitate compliance that disproportionately affects low-
income communities, (3) take into account. voluntary reductions in emis-
sions achieved prior to the implementation of the regulations, (4) comple-
ment federal and state air quality regulation, (5) be cost-effective, (6) con-
sider overall benefit to society beyond just lowering of greenhouse gas
emissions, (7) minimize administrative burden, (8) minimize leakage,8 8 and
(9) take account of the relative contribution of different sources to statewide
emissions of greenhouse gases. 9
The Act specifically allows the Board to impose "market-based compli-
ance mechanisms."90 This is defined as either "a system of market-based de-
clining annual aggregate emissions limitations for sources or categories of
sources that emit greenhouse gases," or "[glreenhouse gas emissions ex-
changes, banking, credits, and other transactions.., that result in the same
greenhouse gas emissions reduction, over the same period, as direct com-
84. ld. § 38551(a).
85. Emma Duncan, The Heat Is On: A Survey of Climate Change, THE ECONOMIST,
Sept. 9, 2006, at 3, 19-20.
86. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38562 (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal.
Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
87. Id. § 38562(a).
88. Id. § 38505(i) ("Leakage" is defined by the Act as "a reduction in emissions
of greenhouse gases within the state that is offset by an increase in emissions of
greenhouse gases outside the state.").
89. Id. § 38562(b).
90. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38570 (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal.
Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
West s Northwest, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 2007
pliance with a greenhouse gas emission limit" or other measure imposed by
the Board.9
If the Board includes market-based compliance mechanisms in its
regulations, it will need to take three additional considerations into account.
.First, the Board will need to take into account possible "direct, indirect, and
cumulative impacts" that market-based compliance mechanisms may create,
especially those in communities that are particularly affected by air pollu-
tion.92 This requirement is complemented by a general mandate that the Act
shall attempt to steer investment toward the "most disadvantaged commu-
nities" in the state and include "small businesses, schools, affordable hous-
ing associations, and other community institutions" in the benefits of those
measures. 93 Second, market-based compliance mechanisms should not re-
sult in increased emissions of "toxic air contaminants or criteria air pollut-
ants."94 Third, market-based compliance mechanisms should maximize the
environmental and economic benefits that result from greenhouse gas regu-
lation.95
Whether market-based compliance mechanisms or command-and-
control regulation is employed, the Board must ensure that all claimed
greenhouse gas emission reductions are "real, permanent, verifiable, and en-
forceable" by the Board.
F. Coordination with National and International Climate
Change Efforts
Though the Act seeks to regulate greenhouse gas emissions from Cali-
fornia, its findings and declarations, requirements, and history show that
both the Legislature and the Governor intend that it should coordinate with
national and international efforts to reduce emissions of greenhouse gases.
The Act's findings and declarations place the Act in a national and in-
ternational context. Comprehensive regulation of greenhouse gases is por-
trayed as another example of California's leadership on environmental is-
sues at both national and international levels.96 The Act is expected to
"encouraglel other states, the federal government, and other countries," to
undertake the "Inlational and international actions... necessary to fully ad-
dress the issue of global warming. '
91. Id. § 38505(k).
92. Id. § 38570(b)(1).
93. Id. § 38565.
94. Id. § 38570(b)(2).
95. Id. § 38570(b)(3).
96. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501 (c) (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal.
Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
97. Id. § 38501(d).
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The process through which the Board will develop the regulations in-
cludes an awareness of national and international efforts. Greenhouse gas
emissions reporting regulations adopted by the Board must be periodically
reviewed to streamline their integration with other national and interna-
tional efforts. In the scoping plan that is to be produced, the Board must
consider other national and international greenhouse gas emissions reduc-
tion programs, specifically including those in Canada and the European Un-
ion.98 Throughout, the Board must "consult with other states .... the federal
government, and other nations to identify the most effective strategies and
methods to reduce greenhouse gases, manage greenhouse gas control pro-
grams, and to facilitate the development of integrated and cost-effective re-
gional, national, and international greenhouse gas reduction programs." 99
Beginning on the day he signed the Act, statements by the Governor
have signaled that he regards the regulatory regime created by the Act as
having both a national and an international role. At the signing ceremony in
San Francisco, the Governor was joined by satellite feed with British Prime
Minister Tony Blair."° Subsequently, the Governor ordered the State Air Re-
sources Board to develop a comprehensive market-based compliance pro-
gram that permits trading with other jurisdictions, specifically the European
Union.' °
V. Legal Challenges to the California Greenhouse Gas Solutions
Act of 2006
Legal challenges to the Act are unlikely until the Board issues regula-
tions. Under the Supreme Court's decision in Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner,
387 U.S. 136 (1967), challenges to agency actions are typically not ripe until
"final agency action."'01 2 Generally, this requires a formal "agency statement
of general or particular applicability and future effect designed to imple-
ment, interpret, or prescribe law or policy." '3 As a result, legal challenges by
entities affected under the early action items would not be anticipated until
the Board adopts regulations to implement those measures on or before
98. Id. § 38561(c).
99. Id. § 38564.
100. Press Release, Office of the Governor, Gov. Schwarzenegger Signs Landmark
Legislation to Reduce Greenhouse Gas Emissions (Sept. 27, 2006) (on file with author), avail-
able at http://gov.ca.gov/index.php?/press-release/41 11.
101. Exec. Order No. S-20-06, available at
http://gov.ca..gov/index.php?/executive-order/44.84.
102. Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
103. Id. (citing 5 U.S.C. §§ 2(c), 2(g), 551(4), 551(13)).
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January 1, 2010.' 4 Challenges by entities not affected by the early action
items would not be expected until the Board issues its final regulations,
which are due on or before January 1, 2011. '
However, in situations when a delay in resolution would result in
hardship, legal challenges to agency regulations may be heard prior to final
agency action. 06 With respect to regulations under the Act, hardship to enti-
ties affected by the early action measures will be easier to show after the
Board publishes those measures, by July 1, 2007.0°7 For those not affected by
the early action measures, hardship will be easier to demonstrate after the
Board determines the statewide greenhouse gas emissions limit on or be-
fore December 31, 2007. '08 This burden will be even clearer after the Board
approves its scoping plan, which is due by January 2, 2009.'09
Challenges to the Pavley regulations in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep pro-
vide a useful guide to the legal challenges the Act may face. First, the Act's
inclusion of out-of-state sources of electrical production, and perhaps its
regulation of vehicular sources of greenhouse gases, may open the Act to
challenges under the Commerce Clause. Second, the Act, both by regulating
greenhouse gases generally and by its repeated reference to foreign coun-
tries, may be preempted because it interferes with United States foreign pol-
icy. Third, if the Pavley regulations do not remain in effect, regulation of
greenhouse gases from vehicles under the Act will be preempted by the fed-
eral Clean Air Act if California cannot obtain a section 209(a) waiver for its
regulation of greenhouse gases from vehicles. Fourth, if the Pavley regula-
tions do not remain in effect, California's regulation of vehicular greenhouse
gas emissions may be preempted by the federal Energy Policy and Conserva-
tion Act's regulation of mileage standards."'
For ease of explanation, challenges to the regulation of greenhouse
gases from vehicular sources will be considered first.
A. Clean Air Act Preemption
Stationary and vehicular emissions of air pollutants are treated differ-
ently under the Clean Air Act. Air pollutants from stationary sources, such
as industrial smokestacks and vents, are regulated under the Clean Air Act
104. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560.5(b) (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006
Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
105. Id. §2 38562.
106. Shalala v. Ill. Council on Long Term Care, Inc. 529 U.S. 1, 13 (2000).
107. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38560.5(a) (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006
Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
108. Id. § 38550.
109. Id. § 38561.
110. 49 U.S.C. § 32902.
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through a process of cooperative federalism. First, the EPA sets standards
for air pollutants that it determines "cause .or contribute to air pollution
which may reasonably be anticipated to endanger public health or wel-
fare..'' Second, each state must devise a plan for how it will attain and
maintain the EPA standards."2 States are given "broad license to institute
their own programs for the reduction of air pollution" from stationary
sources.113
In contrast, the Clean Air Act regulates air pollutants from vehicular
sources uniformly. The EPA is authorized to issue emissions standards for
vehicles sold in the United States. ' 4 Section 209(a) of the Clean Air Act ex-
pressly preempts state regulation of vehicular sources."' An exception to
section 209(a) is made in section 209(b) for California, which may adopt its
own air pollution standards after applying for and obtaining an EPA
waiver. '" For California to be eligible for a waiver, it must first determine
that its standards "will be, in the aggregate, at least as protective of public
health and welfare as applicable Federal standards.""'7 The EPA administra-
tor may deny California's application if she finds that: (1) California's protec-
tiveness determination is "arbitrary and capricious," (2) California "does not
need such ... standards to meet compelling and extraordinary conditions,"
or (3) California's "standards and accompanying enforcement procedures are
not consistent with" EPA's mandate to regulate emissions."'
In December, 2005, the Board requested a section 209(b) waiver for the
Pavley regulations."9 This request is currently pending before the EPA.'
2
1
Prior to the Supreme Court's recent opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA,' 2' it
was unclear whether the EPA had the authority to regulate emissions of
greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. In 1999 and 2000, the EPA Gen-
eral Counsel indicated to Congress that the EPA did have authority to regu-
111. 42 u.s.c. § 7408(a)(l)(A).
112. 42U.S.C.§7410.
113. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S. v. N.Y. State Dep't of Envtl. Conservation, 17
F.3d 521, 525 (2d. Cir. 1994).
114. 42 U.S.C. § 7521, 7541(c).
115. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(a).
116. 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(1).
117. Id.
118. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., 17 F.3d at 526 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
7543(b)(1)).
119. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
120. id.; see also Samantha Young, Associated Press, EPA Revives State's Emissions
Waiver, SAN lOSE MERCURY NEWS, April 4, 2007, at 6A (EPA comments on the status of
the waiver request).
121. Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, slip op. I (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
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late greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act.'22 However, in 2003 the EPA
issued a decision that it does not have the "authority to regulate motor ve-
hicle emissions of... Igreenhouse gasesl under the IClean Air Act."'23 The
decision was based on a legal conclusion and various policy considerations,
including the "language, history, structure and context of the ]Clean Air Actl
and Congressl'sl decision to give Ithe Department of TransportationI au-
thority to regulate fuel economy under the I Energy Policy and Conservation
Act 1.",124
In its opinion in Massachusetts v. EPA, the Court dispelled the uncer-
tainty and found that the EPA does have authority to regulate greenhouse
gas emissions from vehicles under the Clean Air Act "in the event that it
forms a 'judgment' that such greenhouse gas emissions contribute to cli-
mate change."'' Based on the "broad language" of section 202(a) and the
Clean Air Act's "capacious definition of 'air pollutant,"' the Court found that
the enacting Congress clearly intended the Clean Air Act to 'embrace all air-
borne compounds of whatever type.' 26 Additionally, while the Department
of Transportation's exclusive authority to regulate fuel economy standards
may overlap with the EPA's statutory responsibility to "protectl I the public's
'health' and 'welfare,'" the Court did not find either agency's discharge of its
obligations necessarily inconsistent with the other. 27
Accordingly, assuming that the EPA determines that greenhouse gas
emissions contribute to climate change, California's regulation of vehicle
emissions may, at some point, be eligible for a waiver under section 209(b).
Once California determines that its standards "will be, in the aggregate, at
least as protective of public health and welfare as applicable Federal stan-
dards," the EPA Administrator may only deny a waiver if she finds that Cali-
122. See I. Hearing of the H. Subcomm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources
and Regulatory Affairs of the Comm. on Government Reform and the H.. Subcomm. on Energy and
Environment of the Comm. on Science, 106th Cong. (Oct. 6, 1999) (testimony of Gary S.
Guzy, General Counsel of the Environmental Protection Agency, available at
http://www.epa.gov/ocir/hearings/testimony/106_1999_2000/100699gg.htm); Letter
from Gary S. Guzy, EPA General Counsel, to Rep. David M. McIntosh, Chairman, Sub-
comm. on National Economic Growth, Natural Resources, and Regulatory Affairs, H.
Comm. on Government Reform (July 12, 2000).
123. Control of Emissions from New Highway Vehicles and Engines, 68 Fed.
Reg. 52,922, 52,929 (September 8, 2003).
124. Id. at 52,929.
125. Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, slip op. at 25 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
126. Id. at 26, 29-30.
127. Id. at 29.
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fornia's regulations do not meet one or more of the statutory requirements
in section 209(b).1
28
A possible hurdle to California's waiver application may come from the
second statutory requirement: California needs its regulations to meet
'compelling and extraordinary conditions.'' 29 In one view, satisfaction of
this element requires California to demonstrate a unique predicament that
sets California apart from other states as having special needs to control air
pollution generally. This is the argument made by California in its applica-
tion for a section 209(b) waiver for the Pavley regulations; essentially, "Cali-
fornia need not demonstrate lin regard to each regulation of vehicle emis-
sions] that the state faces unique threats from greenhouse gas emissions...
because California. .. continues to face extraordinary and compelling condi-
tions generally."3 °
Another view of the term "extraordinary" would require that green-
house gas emissions cause California to suffer a condition not shared by
other states. This view gains support from the history of California's unique
exception under section 209(b), which Congress granted, in part, because of
California's unique and extreme smog pollution problem. 3' Under this defi-
nition of "extraordinary," the global distribution of greenhouse gas emis-
sions may present a novel challenge to California's ability to obtain a sec-
tion 209(b) waiver. California's coastline is threatened by climate change in
much the same way as that of other states, precisely Massachusetts' stated
128. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., 17 F.3d at 526 (citing 42 U.S.C. §
7543(b)( 1 )).
129. Prior to the Court's decision in Massachusetts v. EPA, debate on California's
waiver request centered on California's ability to obtain a waiver in the absence of
EPA's authority to regulate greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act. See Central Val-
ley Chrysler-jeep v. Witherspoon, 2007 WL 135688 at *I 1I- 12 (E.D. Cal. 2007) (suggesting
that, because section 209(b) explicitly provides that the waiver is for "application of
this section;" EPA's lack of authority to regulate greenhouse gases under section
209(a) of the Clean Air Act must mean that it does not have the power to grant a
waiver under section 209(b)); see also Ann E. Carlson, Environmental Ethics and Policy:
Bringing Philosophy Down to Earth, 27 ENVIRONS ENVrL. L. & POL'Y J. 281, 295-97 (2003)
(suggesting the argument that Clean Air Act section 209 only allows California to
regulate emissions that are already regulated under the Clean Air Act because Cali-
fornia may only obtain a waiver for regulations which are "at least as protective.., as
applicable Federal standards").
130. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., REQUEST FOR A CLEAN AIR ACT SECTION
209(b) WAIVER OF PREEMPTION FOR CALIFORNIA'S ADOPTED AND AMENDED NEW MOTOR
VEHICLE REGULATIONS AND INCORPORATED TEST PROCEDURES TO CONTROL GREENHOUSE GAS
EMISSIONS: SUPPORT DOCUMENT 16 (2005), available at
http://www.arb.ca.gov/cc/docs/att2_support.pdf.
131. Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass'n of the U.S., 17 F.3d at 525-26.
West & Northwest, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 2007
injury in Massachusetts v. EPA. Uncertainty regarding the impact of climate
change on weather events impedes a determination that California, more
than other states, will feel a disproportionate burden due to greenhouse gas
emissions from vehicles. California addressed this challenge in its waiver
request by emphasizing the unique burden that rising sea levels and tem-
peratures will place on its water supply system, and. the increase in the
state's high ozone levels that will be caused by higher temperatures.2
Statistically speaking, denial of a waiver under section 209(b) is
unlikely. Over the past three decades, the EPA has granted over forty of
California's waiver requests. 3 However, several waivers have been either
denied in part or subjected to delays in implementation.'34 Additionally, the
Court in Massachusetts v. EPA declined to reach'the question "whether policy
considerations can inform EPA's actions" if it finds that greenhouse gases
contribute to climate change.35
B. Energy Policy and Conservation Act Preemption
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) directed the Secretary
of Transportation to create federal fuel economy standards for new vehi-
cles. '3 The Secretary has delegated this responsibility to the National
Highway Traffic Safety Administration (NHTSA). 37 The Corporate Average
Fuel Economy (CAFE) standards authorized by the EPCA require a manufac-
turer's new fleet to have a minimum corporate average fuel economy, which
must be set at the "maximum feasible average fuel economy level."'38 Fac-
tors the NHTSA must "consider" include "technological feasibility, economic
practicability, the effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Government
132. CAL. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY AIR RES. BD., supra note 130, at 18.
1 33. Letter from Twenty-One Senators to The Honorable Stephen L. Johnson,
Administrator, Environmental Protection Agency (Mar. 30, 2006), available at
http://feinstein.senate.gov/06releases/pavley-ltr.pdf; see also Carlson, supra note 123, at
293 (finding that, as of 2003, EPA had "never denied California an emissions waiver
(under section 209(b)1 in its entirety").
134. Carlson, supra, note 129, at 293 (citing California State Motor Vehicle Pol-
lution Control Standards: Waiver of Federal Preemption, 40 Fed. Reg. 30,311 (1975);
California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards: Waiver of Federal Pre-
emption, 43 Fed. Reg. 998,999 (Jan. 5, 1978); California State Motor Vehicle Pollution
Control Standards: Waiver of Federal Preemption, 47 Fed. Reg. 1,015 (Jan. 8, 1982);
California State Motor Vehicle Pollution Control Standards: Waiver of Federal Pre-
emption, 67 Fed. Reg. 54,180 (Aug. 21, 2002)).
135. Massachusetts v. EPA, No. 05-1120, slip op. at 32 (U.S. Apr. 2, 2007).
1 36. Central Valley Chrysler-leep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1165.
137. Id.
138. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. §§ 32902(a), 32902(c)).
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on fuel economy, and the need of the United States to conserve energy. '
The provision for the "effect of other motor vehicle standards of the Gov-
ernment" has been interpreted by NHTSA to include EPA waivers under sec-
tion 209 of the Clean Air Act. 
40
The EPCA has an express preemption provision which limits states'
ability to regulate fuel economy standards. Specifically, when a CAFE stan-
dard is in effect, states are prohibited from adopting or enforcing "a law or.
regulation related to fuel economy standards or average fuel economy stan-
dards" for vehicles covered by the CAFE standard.' 4' In contrast to the Clean
Air Act, no exception is available under the CAFE standards for California.'
42
The Bush Administration has asserted that the CAFE standards ex-
pressly preempt all state regulation of carbon dioxide from vehicles.' 43 The
Administration has taken the position that regulations of carbon dioxide
emissions from vehicles necessarily are regulations related to fuel economy,
based on carbon dioxide being a byproduct of gasoline combustion.
The plaintiffs in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep have argued that, regardless
of whether a section 209 waiver is issued, the EPCA preempts the Pavley
regulations because their enforcement would frustrate the stated goals of
the EPCA by creating a more restrictive state scheme.'44 The plaintiffs cite
two of the factors NHTSA weighs in setting CAFE standards as support for
this argument. First, NHTSA must consider the effect that fuel economy
standards have on safety.'45 Second, NHTSA has interpreted the EPCA's ob-
jectives to include "'avoiding serious adverse economic effects on manufac-
turers and maintaining a reasonable amount of consumer choice among a
broad variety of vehicles. '"'46 The plaintiffs argue that the Board's more re-
139. Rachel L. Chanin, California's Authority to Regulate Mobile Source Greenhouse
Gas Emissions, 58 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. Am. L. 699, 734-35 (2003) (citing 49 U.S.C. §'
32902(f) (1994)).
140. Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1165 (citing Light Truck Aver-
age Fuel Economy Standard, Model Year 2004, 67 Fed. Reg. 16,052, 16,057 (April 4,
2002) (to be codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 533) (considering the effect of California's low
emission vehicle regulations in setting CAFE standard)).
141. Id. (citing 49 U.S.C. § 32919).
142. Chanin, supra note 139, at 738 (discussing the relationship between the
CAFE standards and the Clean Air Act).
143. McKinstry, supra note 4, at 71-72 (2004) (citing Press Release, Associated
Press, Bush Backs Emissions Law Opponents (Oct. 10, 2002)).
144: Central Valley Chrysler-leep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1167-70.
145. Id. at 1168.
146. Id. at 1169 (citing Average Fuel Economy Standards for Light Trucks
Model Years 2008-2011, 71 Fed. Reg. 17,566, 17,667 (April 6, 2006) (to be codified at
49 C.F.R. pts. 523-33, 537)).
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strictive regulations will result in vehicles with higher retail prices and de-
creased performance.'47 Additionally, manufacturers will be unable to de-
liver sufficient vehicles to market, which will result in consumers opting for
vehicles less suited to their needs or used vehicles which are less safe.
48
Based on these effects, the plaintiffs argue, it is impossible for them to
comply with both the Pavley regulations and the objectives of the EPCA.'49
The State has asserted that the regulations that receive a section
209(b) waiver are not preempted by the EPCA for four reasons. The State
first argues that in the case of overlapping federal and state regulatory
schemes, state regulation does not provide an obstacle to the federal
scheme.' 0 Second, the Clean Air Act and the EPCA are part of an overlap-
ping federal regulatory scheme because both the EPA and NHTSA take tech-
nological feasibility and economic practicability into account and because
EPA only allows a section 209(b) waiver after enough time has passed to de-
velop the necessary technology to sufficiently lower the cost of compli-
ance. 5' Third, state standards that have been granted a section 209(b)
waiver are treated "as [being in] compliance with federal standards" by the
Clean Air Act, thus giving them federal status and making them immune
from preemption by other federal law. 5 2 Fourth, the EPCA requirement that
NHTSA "consider" the effect of California's regulations is evidence of a con-
gressional intent that NHTSA "respect" California regulations that have re-
ceived a section 209(b) waiver.' 3
In the order denying the State's motion for judgment on the pleadings,
the court indicated that California's unique regulatory authority over vehicle
emissions under the Clean Air Act does not automatically immunize it from
preemption challenges under the EPCA.' 54 The court pointed out. that the
defendants had not introduced any statutory language supporting a con-
gressional intent for a section 209(b) waiver to disrupt application of the
EPCA, and NHTSA had "explicitly found that the challenged regulations
would disrupt the CAFE program.""' 5 While the court agreed that state regu-
lations granted a waiver are treated as being in compliance with federal law
for purposes of the Clean Air Act, the breadth of California's discretion after
receiving a section 209(b) waiver does not, on its own, support a congres-
147. Id.
148. id.
149. Id. at 1167-70.
150. Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1171-72.
151. Id. at 1172.
152. Id. at 1172-73 (for support the defendants cite 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b)(3)).
153. Id. at 1173-74 (citing Defendant's Motion 21:16-17).
154. Id. at 1172.
155. Id. at 1172-73.
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sional intent that California could frustrate other federal schemes.
' 6 Simi-
larly, the term "consider" does not necessarily require that NHTSA do more
than "investigate and analyze what effect the 'other' regulations will have on
fuel economy." '57
C. Dormant Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the U.S. Constitution gives Congress the au-
thority to "regulate Commerce ... among the several states."'" In addition
to granting power to Congress, the Supreme Court has held that the Com-
merce Clause acts as a limitation on state power to take actions which bur-
den interstate commerce even when Congress has not acted to regulate an
activity." 9 This implied limitation is known as the Dormant Commerce
Clause."
Not all state action which burdens the free flow of interstate commerce
is unconstitutional. If a statute is facially discriminatory then it is "virtually
per se ... invalild 1."16' However, when statutes regulate evenhandedly, the
Court has found that "in the absence of conflicting legislation by Congress,
there is a residuum of power in the state to make laws governing matters of
local concern which nevertheless in some measure affect interstate com-
merce or even, to some extent, regulate it."'a6 2 In Pike v. Bruce Church, the
Court held that when a state statute is facially neutral, designed to address a
local concern, and "its effects on interstate commerce are only incidental, it
will be upheld unless the burden imposed on linterstatel commerce is
clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.' 13 However, when
a statute has the practical effect of discriminating against interstate com-
merce, "the burden falls on the Isltate to justify Ithe discrimination] both in
terms of the benefits flowing from the statute and the unavailability of non-
discriminatory alternatives adequate to preserve the local interests at
stake."'"4
Additionally, the Commerce Clause allows Congress to authorize
states to burden interstate commerce. The Supreme Court has held that "[ilf
Congress ordains that the states may freely regulate an aspect of interstate
commerce, any action taken by a State within the scope of the congressional
156. Id. at 1173.
157. Id. at 1173-74.
158. U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
159. Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Adver. Comm'n., 43.2 U.S. 333. 350 (1977).
160. Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004).
161. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617, 624 (1978).
162. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 350.
163. Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
164. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.
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authorization is rendered invulnerable to Commerce Clause challenge."'
However, demonstrating congressional intent to permit states to take action
that would otherwise violate the Commerce Clause is difficult and the bur-
den for showing this intent falls on the state.'66 Such authorization from
Congress must be "unmistakably clear."'
67
1. Business and Energy Production
The regulations called for in the Act are facially neutral, as they do not
overtly favor in-state businesses over out-of-state businesses. Even in the
case of electrical production from other states, which is to be considered by
the Board in crafting its regulations, all regulation will apply to both in-state
and out-of-state electricity providers.' 68 Accordingly, the Pike balancing test
reigns, and the relevant inquiry is whether California's interest in regulating
greenhouse gases is sufficient to outweigh the Act's effect on interstate
commerce. 1
69
It may be argued that state regulatory action designed to significantly
reduce greenhouse gas emissions will have a greater than "incidental" effect
on interstate commerce. For example, for commercial and industrial entities,
state greenhouse gas regulations increase the price of goods, putting down-
ward pressure on demand, decreasing profits, and perhaps lowering invest-
ment in plants and equipment. Ambitious greenhouse gas regulation may
increase the cost of doing business to such a great extent that industrial and
commercial interests find it more economical to move their business out of
California. Industrial interests that have previously located themselves in-
state because of favorable climate conditions or better access to resources
are then faced with increased costs when forced to move even just across
§tate lines. Commercial interests find themselves at a greater distance from
their customers and faced with increased shipping costs and marketing diffi-
culties.
Electrical production provides an even better illustration of the effect
the Act could have on interstate commerce. Pursuant to the Act, the Board's
regulations will govern all electricity consumed in the state, even if that
electricity is imported from outside California.'70 The Legislative intent be-
hind this provision was likely to prevent in-state electricity providers from
165. W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 652-53 (1981).
166. Wyoming v. Oklahoma, 502 U.S. 437, 458 (1992).
167. South Central Timber Dev., Inc. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 91 (f984).
168. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38530 (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006 Cal.
Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
169. Pike, 397 U.S. at 142.
170. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38505(m), 38530 (codified from Cal. A.B. 32,
2006 Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1).
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sourcing more of California's electricity from outside California in order to
escape regulation under the Act. In multiple places, the Legislature evinced
a clear concern with "leakage," defined as a "reduction in emissions of
greenhouse gases within the state that is offset by an increase of emissions
of greenhouse gases outside the state."'7 ' It seems safe to assume that the
Legislature's intent in regulating greenhouse gas emissions from out-of-
state producers was to minimize leakage and not to directly affect sales by
out-of-state electricity providers.
However, if one considers the relative emissions from energy produc-
ers within California and those in other states, it becomes clear that the Act
will have a significant discriminatory effect on interstate commerce. Com-
pared to California, the Southwest generates more of its energy through
coal-fired power plants' 72 Coal-fired power plants produce comparatively
higher emissions of greenhouse gases than natural gas, hydroelectric, or nu-
clear power generation.' As a result, regulations that offer incentives for
the use of energy produced at facilities that produce less greenhouse gas
emissions will necessarily create disincentives for the use of power from
these plants. This disincentive will create a burden for energy producers
who seek to sell energy to California, the world's eighth-largest economy.'74
Given the potential impact on interstate commerce, California's green-
house gas regulation would only be constitutional if the state's interest in
regulation were overwhelming. It is now generally accepted that global cli-
mate change will cause severe environmental effects.'75 California's interests
in protecting the economy, environment, and public health will be threat-
ened by these changes. 7 ' However, demonstrating a compelling state inter-
est, even when that interest is the health and safety of California's citizens,
171. Id. § 38505(j); 38562(b)(8).
172. Brian H. Potts, Regulating Greenhouse Gas Leakage: How California Can Evade
The Impending Constitutional Attacks, ELECTRICITY JOURNAL, June 2006, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=93 1218.
173. Duncan, supra note 85, at 18.
174. See http://www.ccsce.com/pdf/NumbersCA-Rank.pdf.
175. Duncan, supra note 85, at 3-6.
176. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 38501(a) (codified from Cal. A.B. 32, 2006
Cal. Stat., ch. 488, sec. 1) (The California Global Warming Solutions Act of 2006 lists
the many public interests that will be threatened by global climate change, including
the "exacerbation of air quality problems, a reduction in the quality and supply of
water to the state from the Sierra snowpack, a rise in sea levels resulting in the dis-
placement of thousands of coastal businesses and residences, damage to . . . the
natural environment, and an increase in the incidences of infectious diseases ... and
other human health-related problems.").
West s Northwest, Vol. 13, No. 2, Summer 2007
is not enough to justify regulation which burdens interstate commerce, .7
California must also justify the burden "both in terms of the benefits flowing
from the statute and the unavailability of nondiscriminatory alternatives
adequate to preserve the local interests at stake.' 
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The nature of climate change raises the question of whether a state
can demonstrate sufficient beneficial local impact from its greenhouse gas
regulation to outweigh the burden such regulation would place on interstate
commerce."'9 Climate change, unlike many other environmental problems,
is global in nature. California is estimated to be the world's twelfth largest
contributor to greenhouse gas emissions.'80 Given that developing countries
are expected to drastically increase their emissions of greenhouse gases in
coming years, a cut of 50% of California's greenhouse gas emissions would
represent a small fraction of world emissions and yield fairly insignificant
benefits.
While the scope of this note is concerned with the effects of the Cali-
fornia Global Warming Solutions Act, its context includes Senate Bill 1368,
which also governs electrical generation of all electricity consumed in Cali-
fornia. Senate Bill 1368 prohibits the California Public Utilities Commission
from approving a long-term contract with an electricity provider unless the
generation of the power supplied under the contract does not produce any
more greenhouse gases than the generation of the same power would have
had using the most modern natural gas-fired power plant.'8' Due to the rela-
tive prevalence of coal-fired power plants in the Southwest, this statute
raises the same concerns about interference with interstate commerce in
electricity that are present in the Act. Regulation under Senate Bill 1368 will
begin on February 1, 2007, considerably earlier than the regulations under
the Act.' 82 Accordingly, litigation over regulations under Senate Bill 1368
will serve as a good guide for the challenges that will arise under the Act.
2. Vehicular Sources
Arguments by the parties in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep illustrate the ap-
plication of the Dormant Commerce Clause with respect to state regulation
of vehicular sources of greenhouse gases.
Assembly Bill 1493 is, in many aspects, a scaled down version of the
Act. The bill directed the Board to regulate emissions of the same six
177. Dean Milk Co. v. Madison, 340 U.S. 349, 354 (1951).
178. Hunt, 432 U.S. at 353.
179. Duncan, supra note 85, at 18, 23.
180. Press Release, supra note 100.
181. CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE § 8341 (codified from Cal. S.B. 1368, 2006 Cal. Stat.,
ch. 598).
182. Id. § 8341(d).
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greenhouse gases regulated by the Act.'83 The Board is also directed to
weigh economic considerations, including impact on creation of jobs, busi-
ness growth, and business competitiveness, especially as related to the
automobile sector. '8 As in the Act, attention is directed toward considera-
tions of social equity, with special concern for economic impact on commu-
nities with high levels of air pollution, including those with minority or low-
income populations.'5
The plaintiffs in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep alleged that the Pavley regula-
tions violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Specifically, the plaintiffs ar-
gued that the regulations burden the "'production and sale of new motor ve-
hicles' while providing 'no local environmental benefit, or insubstantial
benefits at best.""' As mentioned above, the difficulty of showing how
greenhouse gas emissions reductions from a single state will make a signifi-
cant difference to global climate change casts doubt over California's ability
to demonstrate a sufficiently compelling interest under Pike. This is all the
more true when the reductions will be from vehicles alone.
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However, California's special treatment under the Clean Air Act's pre-
emption of state regulation of vehicle emissions suggests that Congress has
immunized California from challenges under the Dormant Commerce
Clause.' 8 As the State in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep pointed out, legislative
history shows that when Congress debated the merits of a separate emis-
sions standard for new vehicles from California, it acknowledged that a sepa-
rate standard would have a significant effect on interstate commerce.' 89 Dur-
ing the congressional debate on California's waiver, the auto industry
protested that allowing exceptions to a uniform standard would unduly bur-
den the industry.'9° Despite such impacts, the Senate Committee that con-
sidered the bill felt that allowing California to be an experimental laboratory
for emissions control would be sufficiently valuable to the nation to offset
the burden on the national economy, and it pressed ahead with the
183. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §, 43018.5(i)(1) (codified from Cal. A.B. 1493,
2002 Cal. Stat., ch. 200, sec. 3) (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 42801.1(g)).
184. id. § 43018.5(c)(2).
185. Id. §§ 43018.5(c)(2)(E); 43018.5(c)(4); 43018.5(g)(1).
186 Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1183.
187. Vehicles are estimated to produce 41% of California's greenhouse gas
emissions. BEMIS & ALLEN, supra note 25.
188. See 42 U.S.C. § 7543(b).
189. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1184 (citing Motor & Equipment
Manufacturers Association v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109-10, 1121 (D.C. Cir. 1979)).
190. Motor & Equip. Mfrs. Assoc. v. EPA, 627 F.2d 1095, 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1979) (cit-
ing S. Rep. No. 90-403, 33 (1967) (discussing the auto industry position on Califor-
nia's Clean Air Act waiver)).
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waiver. 9 ' Legislative history from the House and Senate shows that both
enacted the waiver despite an acknowledged risk of burden to interstate
commerce.
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The legislative history and the structure of section 209 of the Clean Air
Act thus point to the conclusion that Congress intended to immunize Cali-
fornia from Commerce Clause challenges for regulations of vehicular emis-
sions that have been approved by the EPA. The plaintiffs in Central Valley
Chrysler-jeep conceded this point, arguing instead that Congress's enactment
of the Energy Policy and Conservation Act, discussed above, implicitly re-
voked California's permission to burden interstate commerce under the
Clean Air Act.'93 On balance, the court held that the evidence cited by the
plaintiffs as support for this proposition did not sufficiently contravene Con-
gress's earlier grant of permission to burden interstate commerce.'94 As a
result, the plaintiffs' Dormant Commerce Clause claims were dismissed.' 9
Based on the singular example of Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, it appears
unlikely that regulation of vehicle emissions of greenhouse gases by the
Board violate the Dormant Commerce Clause, so long as those regulations
have been issued a waiver under section 209(b).
D. Foreign Policy Preemption
Unlike localized or "point" pollutants, greenhouse gases emitted in
one country necessarily affect all others. Accordingly, state regulation of
greenhouse gas emissions necessarily has effects outside the United States
that may affect foreign policy. As a result, these state regulations, to the ex-
tent that they undercut the Executive Branch's ability to negotiate and en-
force agreements on reductions of greenhouse gases, may be unconstitu-
tional.
Although no federal statute, treaty, or executive agreement expressly
preempts state regulation of greenhouse gases, states may nonetheless be
implicitly preempted by federal law.' 96 This may arise due to field preemp-
tion if there is a federal regulatory scheme so comprehensive that it leaves
no room for additional state regulation.' 9' It may also occur due to conflict
191. Id. at 1109-10.
192. Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1184-85.
193. Id. at 1185.
194. Id. at 1185-86.
195. Id. at 1186.
196. Notes, Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1877, 1878 (2006),
197. Id.
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preemption if there is no way to comply with both state and federal regula-
tion.'98
The plaintiffs in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep assert that the Board's regula-
tion of vehicular emissions of greenhouse gases is preempted due to an im-
plicit conflict with federal foreign policy.'9 This implied conflict arises from
what one scholar has labeled the "bargaining chip theory.2 °" Based on two
pieces of evidence, the plaintiffs assert that unilateral regulation by one
state is out of step with the Bush Administration's policy of "international
cooperation" and an internationally "coordinated response" to climate
change.2"' The first piece of evidence cited is the EPA report referenced ear-
lier in this note. Among the policy reasons cited in that report for not regu-
lating vehicular emissions of greenhouse gases under the Clean Air Act was
the disadvantage that unilateral regulation would impose on President
Bush's expressed foreign policy." 2 The argument assumes that developing
countries will not undertake regulation of their greenhouse gas emissions in
response to unilateral greenhouse gas emissions regulations in the United
States. Such a lack of reciprocal regulation by developing countries would
allow those countries to be "free-riders," enjoying the benefits of lowered
greenhouse gas emissions without having to make sacrifices for them. This
would eventually have the effect of canceling out any emissions reductions
accomplished by the United States.0 3
The plaintiffs also seek support in the reasoning of a New York district
court that held that public nuisance claims based on greenhouse gas emis-
sions present nonjusticiable political questions. 20 4 The opinion considered
the Bush Administration's approach to greenhouse gas reduction in the con-
text of past Executive Branch and Congressional actions. As discussed ear-
lier in this note, several steps have been taken on climate change by the
198. Id.
199. Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1176-79.
200. Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra
note 190, at 1881.
201. Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-78.
202. Id. at 1176-77 (citing Control of Emissions, 68 Fed. Reg. at 52, 931).
203. Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emissions, supra
note 196, at 1881-83.
204. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1177 (citing State of Connecticut
v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d 265 (S.D.N.Y. 2005)). (The California Attorney
General has subsequently filed a federal common law nuisance claim against the
same auto manufacturers in the federal district court in California. Nick Bunkley,
California Sues 6 Automakers Over Global Warming, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 21, 2006, at C2. At
press time, the court had yet to rule on the automakers' motion to dismiss.)
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federal government. 2 5 The opinion noted consistent themes of study and
efforts toward international cooperation, a step toward binding regulation of
greenhouse gases when President Clinton signed the Kyoto Pr6tocol, the
backlash against mandatory regulation as expressed by the unanimously
passed Byrd-Hagel Resolution, and subsequent opposition to mandatory
regulation by the Bush Administration.0 6 The opinion included mention of
the EPA report discussed above."'
The State makes several arguments to refute the plaintiffs' assertions
of federal policy against unilateral reductions in greenhouse gas emissions.
First, the State claims that the UNFCCC, including the obligation for devel-
oped countries to adopt "policies... Ithatl will demonstrate that developed
countries are taking the lead" in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases,
bound the United States to unilateral reductions in greenhouse gases.2
Second, the CAFE program, through its indirect regulation of greenhouse
gases, shows federal willingness to unilaterally regulate greenhouse gases.
Third, statements of some federal State Department officials indicate that
the Bush Administration does not intend to negotiate binding greenhouse
gas reductions." 9 Fourth, the Clean Air Act section 209(b) waiver for Califor-
nia is an implicit congressional authorization to affect the area of green-
house gas regulation, and the Supreme Court has previously upheld state
regulation of tax reporting requirements which angered foreign governments
when it found Congress had implicitly allowed state regulation in the area."'
The court found none of the State's arguments sufficient to sustain a
judgment on the pleadings. While the court did not address the State's as-
sertion that the terms of the UNFCCC required unilateral emissions reduc-
tions, it did note that the State's three other arguments, when read narrowly,
placed few constraints on the President's foreign policy. The court held that
the CAFE standards may constrain what agreements the President may
make, but are not necessarily inconsistent with a policy of reducing green-
house gas emissions through international agreements;' the U.S. State De-
partment officials' statements cited by the State do not foreclose the possi-
bility that the Bush Administration intends to negotiate multilateral
205. See supra Part 11.
206. Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 1177-78 (citing State of Con-
necticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co. 406 F. Supp. 2d at 269-70).
207. Id. (citing State of Connecticut v. Am. Elec. Power Co., 406 F. Supp. 2d at 270).
208. Id. at 1179-80.
209. Id. at 1180-81.
210. Id. at 1181-82 (citing Barclays Bank PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298,
302, 324-26 (1994)).
211. Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep, 456 F. Supp 2d at 1181-82 (citing Barclays Bank
PLC v. Franchise Tax Bd., 512 U.S. 298, 302, 324-26 (1994)).
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agreements;2 2 and the section 209(b) waiver is not conclusive evidence that
Congress intended to allow California emissions regulations to hamper for-
eign policy, especially without a showing that Congress had contemplated
regulation of greenhouse gases when it passed the Clean Air Act.2 3
Serious difficulties exist for courts construing claims that a state's
regulation of greenhouse gas emissions is preempted based on its implied
conflict with foreign policy. 214 Initially, a court must determine whether the
United States plans to negotiate an international agreement, based on past
action and inaction. It must then decide whether the state regulation in
question will, in fact, obstruct foreign policy, based on the perceived mo-
tives and preferences of both the United States and foreign nations. Lastly,
it must consider the strength of the state's interest in the challenged regula-
tions, a question that presents particular problems in the area of green-
house gas regulation for reasons touched on in the earlier discussion of
Dormant Commerce Clause preemption.
Notably, the ambiguities presented in Central Valley Chrysler-Jeep could
be swept away by the Bush Administration if it chose to make a clear state-
ment about its foreign policy on climate change. The President can always
sign an executive order with another country which commits the United
States to a non-binding emissions reduction and which includes language
expressly preempting state regulation of greenhouse gases."5
Finally, the course California chooses to pursue in integrating its
greenhouse gas regulation scheme with those of other countries may in-
crease the appearance of a conflict with the Bush Administration's foreign
policy.
VI. Possible Outcomes
Broadly speaking, three possible outcomes await California's manda-
tory greenhouse gas regulation scheme. First, it is possible that the regula-
tions under Assembly Bill 1493, Senate Bill 1368, and the California Global
Warming Solutions Act will not survive challenges in the courts. This result
would fall far short of the aspirations California's Legislature and the Gover-
nor have for the Act. However, inability to enforce the regulations would not
mean that California's recent steps toward mandatory greenhouse gas regu-
lation would not have a significant effect. The Act is the United States' first
legislation creating a comprehensive scheme of mandatory greenhouse gas
212. Id.
213. id.
214. For a more thorough discussion of the problems confronting a court in
this circumstance, see Foreign Affairs Preemption and State Regulation of Greenhouse Gas Emis-
sions, supra note 196, at 1889-94.
215. Potts, supra note 172, at 8.
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regulation of all sectors. Several aspects of the Act may well influence a fu-
ture federal greenhouse gas regulatory regime: its reliance on an existing
administrative body devoted to air pollution issues; its emphasis on early
regulation of sectors with the greatest emissions; its insistence on a reliable
way to register and certify emissions reductions; the setting of an ambitious
target for greenhouse gas emissions reductions; and its clear focus on the
environmental justice effects of any regulatory scheme.
Second, the regulations promulgated under Assembly Bill 1493, Sen-
ate Bill 1368, and the Act, or some combination of the three, may survive le-
gal challenges. The phasing in of regulations may help the State Air Re-
sources Board craft the regulations under the Act in a manner more apt to
survive legal challenges. Litigation surrounding the Pavley regulations has
drawn out the legal arguments against regulation of greenhouse gases from
vehicles. These arguments offer lessons to the Air Resources Board on how
to craft future regulations of greenhouse gases from automobiles, should
the current regulations not be enforceable. For example, based on the EPCA
preemption arguments advanced in Central Valley Chrysler-jeep, any future
regulations of greenhouse gases from vehicles promulgated by the Board are
likely to stipulate that they are not regulations of fuel economy standards.
In a similar fashion, legal challenges to the regulations mandated by Senate
Bill 1368 are likely to inform the Board's decisions about how to craft the
regulations under the Act dealing with greenhouse gases emitted from elec-
trical generation.
Action by Congress could help to insulate the Act from a legal chal-
lenge under the Dormant Commerce Clause and influence the outcome of
legal challenges based on interference with the President's foreign policy. In
spite of President Bush's resistance to mandatory, unilateral greenhouse gas
regulation, Congress can shield California's greenhouse gas regulations
from claims under the Dormant Commerce Clause by passing a resolution
authorizing California to interfere with interstate commerce as necessary to
prevent leakage. Congress can also minimize the success of challenges
based on foreign policy preemption. The Supreme Court's recent foreign
policy preemption decision in American Insurance Association v. Garamendi2 6
suggests that Justice Jackson's tripartite analysis from Youngstown Sheet and
Tube v. Sawyer2 7 is applicable to the preemptive scope of the President's for-
eign policy power. Whereas the Byrd-Hagel Resolution may have operated
as an implied authorization of the President's position on greenhouse gas
regulation previously, a new congressional resolution advocating a manda-
tory international greenhouse gas regulation program would expressly con-
tradict the President's stated foreign policy. When the President acts in the
216. Am. Ins. Ass'n v. Garamendi, 539 U.S. 396, 414 (2003).
217. Youngstown Sheet and Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 635 (1952) (Jackson, I.,
concurring).
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face of clear congressional disapproval, "his power is at its lowest ebb" and
"Iclourts can sustain exclusive Presidential control in such a case only by




Third, it is possible that California's recent actions will inspire a com-
prehensive scheme of federal greenhouse gas emissions regulations. Sev-
eral climate change related bills are pending in the 110th Congress."9 The
Speaker of the House of Representatives, Nancy Pelosi, and the Chair of the
Senate Environment and Public Works Committee, Barbara Boxer, both from
California, are advocating aggressive regulation of greenhouse gas emis-
sions.22 Senator Boxer has held up the California Global Warming Solutions
Act as a model for federal regulation.22' If California's recent regulations mo-
tivate comprehensive and equally ambitious federal greenhouse gas regula-
tions, California's recent steps toward mandatory regulation will accomplish
all that the Legislature set out to do.
VII. Conclusion
While the California Global Warming Solutions Act was not inevitable,
it was not a surprise. For eighteen years, California legislators had been at
the vanguard of national efforts to assess and mitigate the effects of anthro-
pogenic emissions of greenhouse gases on climate. In 2002, it became the
only state to eschew voluntary greenhouse gas reduction measures in favor
of mandatory regulation. As the only state whose vehicle emissions stan-
dards may be granted a waiver under Clean Air Act section 209, California is
also the only state that might be successful in implementing comprehensive
regulations of all sources of emissions.
As the legal challenges to Assembly Bill 1493 reveal, significant chal-
lenges to the California Global Warming Solutions Act are likely once the Air
Resources Board promulgates its early action regulations in 2010, and may
even begin once the Board adopts early action measures in mid-2007. Not-
withstanding the outcome of these challenges, California will have made an
218. id. at 637-38.
219. Barringer, supra note 16.
220. On February 8, 2007, Speaker Pelosi told the House Science and Tech-
nology Committee both that United States greenhouse gas emissions needed to be
cut in half by 2050 and that mandatory regulation.was necessary to achieve that goal.
Cornelia Dean, Pelosi Backs Restrictions on Heat-Trapping Gases, N.Y. TIMES, February 9,
2007, at A16; Press Release, Senator Barbara Boxer, Boxer Makes History at EPW (Nov.
14, 2006) (on file with author, also available at
http://boxer.senate.gov/news/releases/record.cfm?id=265868).
221. Press Release, Senator Barbara Boxer, Statement by Senator Boxer on Califor-
nia's Landmark Steps to Combat Global Warming (Aug. 31, 2006) (on file with author, also
available at http://boxer.senate.gov/news/releases/record.cfm?id=262293).
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appreciable impact on national climate change policy. Given the expansive
title of the Act and the Legislature's stated intent to stimulate national and
international action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions, it remains to be
seen whether the results will meet the Legislature's expectations.
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